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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In den letzten Jahren hat sich eine "unified theory" aus der Arbeitsökonomik heraus-
gebildet, in der die Meinung vorherrscht, dass die Kombination makroökonomi- 
scher Schocks und flexibler Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen in den USA eine starke Zu-
nahme der Lohnungleichheit verursacht habe, während die gleichen Schocks in 
Europa vor allem für gering qualifizierte Arbeitnehmer eine hohe Arbeitslosigkeit und 
geringe Beschäftigungsniveaus gebracht hätten als (unerwünschter) Nebeneffekt der 
durch die strikten institutionellen Regelungen des Arbeitsmarkts in Europa rigiden 
Löhne. 
In der vorliegenden Analyse wird hingegen argumentiert, dass Institutionen in 
Europa eigene Formen der Flexibilität entwickelt hätten, die – im Gefolge der in der 
"unified theory" beschriebenen Schocks – ebenfalls zu einer zunehmenden Un-
gleichheit in Europa geführt hätten, aber eben in anderer Gestalt. In Frankreich sei 
beispielsweise die Ungleichheit bei der Arbeitsplatzsicherheit schneller gewachsen 
als in den USA. Darüber hinaus hätten Entwicklungen auf dem französischen Ar-
beitsmarkt dazu geführt, dass sich gering qualifizierte Arbeitnehmer in unsicheren 
Beschäftigungsverhältnissen konzentrierten.  
Diese Ergebnisse stellen eine Herausforderung an die Sichtweise dar, dass Ar-
beitslosigkeit der Hauptmechanismus sei, durch den die europäischen Arbeitsmärkte 
asymmetrische Schocks auf der Arbeitsnachfrageseite absorbierten. Ebenso wird in 
Frage gestellt, dass Europa nicht bereit sei, Ungleichheit zu tolerieren; vielmehr wird 
die Annahme gestützt, dass der Hauptunterschied auf den beiden Seiten des Atlan-
tiks in dem Typus von Ungleichheiten liegt, den die jeweiligen Gesellschaften zu 
tolerieren bereit sind. 
 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years a “unified theory” has emerged out of labor economics, which argues 
that a combination of “macroeconomic shocks” and flexible labor market institutions 
in the U.S. has produced strong upward trends in wage inequality, while these same 
shocks have produced high unemployment and low employment growth in Europe as 
a side effect of the wage stability preserved by that continent’s rigid labor market in-
stitutions. This paper argues instead that European institutions in fact have evolved 
their own form of flexibility, which, in combination with the macroeconomic shocks 
described in the unified theory, have also led to rising inequality in Europe, but of a 
different form. Taking France as an example, inequality of employment security has 
risen faster here than in the U.S. Furthermore, trends in the French labor market 
have led to increased concentration of low-skill workers in these insecure job 
statuses. These results challenge the view that unemployment is the main mecha-
nism through which European labor markets absorbed asymmetric shocks to their 
demand for labor. They also challenge the view that Europeans have intolerance for 
inequality, but instead suggest that the main difference between the two sides of the 
Atlantic concerns the nature of the inequalities that each society is willing to tolerate. 
 
Contents 
1.  Introduction ...................................................................................6 
2.  A Generalized Theory of Labor Market Evolution ......................8 
3.  Concepts and Data......................................................................13 
4.  Results – Comparing Contingent Jobs in France  
and the U.S. .................................................................................18 
5.  Results – Testing the Generalized Perspective on  
Inequality Trends.........................................................................22 
6.  Discussion ...................................................................................28 
References ............................................................................................31 
Appendix: Matching Methodology......................................................36 
Tables ...................................................................................................  38 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
∙ “… the U.S. experience of declining unemployment, falling to steady real 
wages, and rapidly rising wage inequality and the EU experience of rising un-
employment, rising real wages, and comparatively stable relative-wage levels 
are two sides of the same coin. The United States permitted real and relative 
wages to adjust, while many countries in Europe … chose to let employment 
take the brunt of the shocks.”  
∙      Blau and Kahn (2002, p. 256) 
 
Comparisons between the performance of the American and European labor 
markets has been a topic of growing interest both among scholars of the labor 
market and of the welfare state. The reason for this attention is the evidence that 
labor market trends have moved in separate directions on the two sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean. The American labor market has experienced a sharp rise in 
earnings inequality. In Europe, the most notable change has been stagnant job 
growth and high unemployment.  Whereas unemployment in western European 
countries was lower than in America in the 1970s, unemployment is now rela-
tively high in Europe while wages remain relatively high and inequality remains 
low in comparison with the U.S. 
Why do the experiences of Europe and America appear to be trending in dif-
ferent directions? A group of scholars have recently analyzed a decade of 
research by labor economists and argued that these apparently divergent ex-
periences can be explained by what has been termed a “unified theory” (Blank 
1977; Blau and Kahn 2002; see also Krugman 1994). As shown in the quotation 
at the start of this paper, the unified theory argues that differences in the labor 
market structure of European and American countries have produced two dis-
tinct reactions to a common set of macroeconomic “shocks.” According to this 
theory, the U.S. tolerates large differences in individual-level labor market out-
comes, while Europe prefers relatively homogeneous outcomes for workers.  
The interaction between the “shocks” of the past twenty five years and these 
different institutional preferences has led to the divergence in labor market out-
comes between the U.S. and Europe. 
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The current paper challenges this theory’s depiction of European institutions as 
rigid and preserving of relatively egalitarian outcomes for workers at the ex-
pense of those not able to work (who are then supported by the safety net of the 
European welfare state).  We challenge also the empirical contrast between a 
Europe with stable inequality at the cost of low employment growth and high 
unemployment and a U.S. with rising inequality. We argue instead for a general-
ized theory of labor market evolution that takes a broader perspective on both 
institutional flexibility and on inequality than does the unified theory. 
Our generalized theory sees institutional flexibility as growing on both sides 
of the Atlantic, though both the trend and the pattern of flexibility take a different 
form in Europe than in the U.S. We further argue that rising institutional flexibility 
has generated increasing levels of inequality on both sides of the Atlantic.  How-
ever, the inequality is of a more generalized nature than commonly portrayed.  
When one understands a job as an employment relationship, one sees that the 
“returns” to the job go beyond wages to include employment security as well.  
Either component of a job’s “returns” can be more or less unequal across the 
population of employed workers. Considering both outcomes together yields a 
concept that might be termed “generalized inequality.” Generalized inequality, 
we suggest, actually has been increasing on both sides of the Atlantic, but insti-
tutional differences have caused inequality in the employment security 
component to grow relatively rapidly in Europe, while inequality in the wage 
component grew rapidly in the U.S. We present empirical evidence to support 
this for the case of France, which is portrayed by the unified theory as a typical 
European country having a highly regulated labor market, stability in wage ine-
quality, and high unemployment relative to the U.S. 
In particular, this paper demonstrates several important differences between 
trend and distribution of insecure job positions in a typical continental European 
country like France and in the U.S. First, just as low wages in the U.S. charac-
terize the employment experience of young and low-skill workers, low-security 
jobs in France are heavily concentrated among young and low-skilled workers.  
Second, just as market globalization and technological changes have increased 
the proportion of low-paid jobs in the U.S. and induced stagnation in American 
real wages, these forces have increased the overall proportion of low-security 
jobs in France in the past two decades; this increase in job insecurity has been 
larger in France than in the U.S. Third, the increase in job insecurity has been 
more significant for low-skilled than for skilled French workers. This trend is a 
direct consequence of the interaction between the flexible employment regula-
tions implemented in France (as in most European countries) in the 1980s and 
the recent macroeconomic shocks emphasized by the unified theory. The em-
pirical results of this paper challenge the view that unemployment is the main 
mechanism through which European labor markets absorbed asymmetric 
shocks to their demand for labor, and also challenge the unified theory’s asser-
tion that levels of inequality are relatively stable for those French workers who 
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do have a job.  In generalized terms, we find that inequality has risen rapidly in 
France just as in the U.S.  
2. A Generalized Theory of Labor Market Evolution 
During the early 1970s, unemployment in Western Europe was under 3% while 
U.S. unemployment was almost 5% and a source of serious political concern.  
But between the early 1970s and the late 1990s, western European unemploy-
ment had tripled while American unemployment had fallen.  Wage inequality in 
the U.S., however, increased dramatically during these years even as real wage 
growth was stagnant; in contrast, wage inequality has increased only modestly 
in Western Europe. How should we explain such different relative positions of 
these regions in the 1970s and the present time? 
An emerging new “unified theory” of labor markets seeks to explain these 
trends as the product of an interaction between “macroeconomic shocks” and 
relatively stable but cross-nationally variable labor market institutions. The uni-
fied theory can be summarized in terms of three propositions: [1] the major 
institutional features of major industrialized countries have remained relatively 
stable since the 1970s (when unemployment was relatively low in Europe and 
high in the U.S), [2] the macroeconomic context has changed considerably since 
the 1970s; specifically, the industrialized world has experienced a common set 
of “macroeconomic shocks” during this period, and [3] the labor market out-
comes in a country are a product of the interaction between that country’s 
institutional features and the common global “macroeconomic shocks.” 
The unified theory’s assertion of institutional stability over time and hetero-
geneity across countries can be expressed in more sociological terms as the 
assertion that European countries have a preference for relatively egalitarian 
employment relationships. Labor market outcomes are defined at the social as 
well as the individual level (what the Germans call the “Sozialmarkt”), and this 
social character is preserved even to the detriment of economic and employ-
ment growth. In contrast the U.S. has a preference for an efficient labor market. 
Labor in the U.S. is more fully commodified, labor market outcomes are more 
“individual” in character, and differences in worker productivity translate into 
wage inequality in order to maintain strong incentives to work and high rates of 
economic growth. 
The major common “macroeconomic shocks” to global labor markets during 
the past thirty years have been [1] low productivity growth, [2] inflation in the 
1970s followed by disinflation in the 1980s and 1990s, [3] growing levels of in-
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ternational trade, and [4] a technologically driven steady decline in the relative 
demand for low-skilled labor (Blank 1997, Blau and Kahn 2002).  According to 
the unified theory, these three macroeconomic shocks produced downward 
pressure on low-skill wages and upward pressure on wage inequality in all in-
dustrialized countries. However, the realization of these pressures as actual 
trends in labor market outcomes depended on the character of national labor 
market institutions. 
According to the unified theory, the impact of these shocks on the American 
labor force was largely unbuffered by labor market regulation.  While not an ex-
plicit part of the unified theory, it is arguable that the flexibility of American labor 
markets increased even further over this period, mainly because of the Reagan 
era decline in the power of American unions but also because of changes in the 
compensation policies of American corporations, which used (now empirically 
discredited) theories of performance-based executive compensation to further 
erode already only weakly-constraining wage norms in the U.S.  Because U.S. 
wage setting mechanisms are flexible, American wages adjusted to these 
shocks and their impact on employment levels was relatively small.  In contrast, 
the rigidity of European wage-setting mechanisms minimized the impact of these 
shocks on the wage structure and redirected their impact onto unemployment 
and employment levels for low-skill workers. American and European arrange-
ments represent two opposite responses to the same basic growth-equality 
trade-off. 
Supporters of the unified theory cite many empirical studies as support for 
the theory’s main hypotheses (Blau and Kahn 2002).  At the same time, how-
ever, important aspects of the empirical record are not obviously consistent with 
the theory’s predictions.  One conundrum concerns the experience of countries 
like the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway or Austria, who have unemployment 
rates comparable to U.S. rates even as their wage-setting institutions are com-
paratively centralized, their unemployment insurance is generous and their level 
of wage inequality is low. Also, despite extensive empirical investigation, there 
exists only mixed evidence that the high European wage floors have reduced 
relative employment levels for lower-skill workers, so a key component of the 
unified theory remains in some doubt (Blau and Kahn 2002, chapter 6, see es-
pecially p. 223). 
For example, recent research on unemployment in the U.S. and Germany 
finds that the rate of employment growth for low skill workers in Germany was 
almost identical to that in the U.S. despite dissimilar wage trends (Krueger and 
Pischke 1997).  Specifically, the wages for low skill workers have risen in Ger-
many in recent decades, in both absolute and relative terms, while they have 
been declining in the U.S. (Krueger and Pischke 1997, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
1993). These facts are at odds with the unified theory, which predicts that low 
skilled German workers should experience especially low employment growth 
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rates because the persisting high floor on their wages should price them out of 
the labor market.  Additional research finds that growth in unemployment among 
German workers was not concentrated among low-skill workers (Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 1997). Moreover, Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) found that while 
the relative wages of French workers with low skills did not fall from the begin-
ning to the end of the 1980s (which contrasts sharply with the American 
experience), employment growth among low skill groups was not slower in 
France than in the U.S. (see also Nickell and Bell 1995, 1996 for additional con-
trary evidence). While the opposing evidence may not be decisive,1 it has led to 
a search for alternative explanations for the different inequality trends in the U.S. 
and France than that offered by the unified theory.2  
The current paper criticizes the unified theory, but also goes beyond criti-
cism to develop a plausible alternative theory of relative inequality trends on the 
two sides of the Atlantic. In our view the empirical failings of the unified theory 
arise from limitations in its conception of institutional change and of core labor 
market outcomes.  On the institutional side, the unified theory does not fully ac-
knowledge the importance of changes that took place in Europe in the early 
eighties, when new flexible labour contracts became possible and when the 
costs to employers of making layoffs were reduced.3 On the macroeconomic 
side, it neglects the rapid globalization of western economies, where financial 
and physical capital is increasingly mobile and markets increasingly instable 
(Morris and Western 1999). Because of these two omissions, the unified theory 
                                            
1  One limitation of the evidence in Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) and Kreuger and 
Pitsche (1997) is that it does not control for industry.  Arguably the unified theory’s prediction 
of a tradeoff between the wage and employment levels of low-skill labor would occur within 
specific industries, not at the level of the aggregate economy.  Acemoglu (2002) modeled 
the relationship between changes in relative wages and changes in relative employment lev-
els between high skilled and low skilled labor both under the assumption that technology is 
the same in Europe and America and under the assumption that technology in Europe is the 
same as in America after a fixed lag.  He found that changes in relative wages are equally 
responsive to changes in relative labor supply of high and low skilled workers in Germany as 
in the U.S., which would support the unified theory, but not in Belgium, Denmark, or Sweden, 
which does not support it.  However, his evidence is not definitive because of data compara-
bility issues and his need to make specific assumptions about the elasticity of substitution 
between skilled and unskilled labor across the countries under analysis.  Additional crude 
evidence that would appear to be not inconsistent with the unified theory is the fact that the 
ratio of high skill to low skill employment growth was greater in France and Germany than 
the U.S. during the 1990s, which was a time when wage inequality continued to grow faster 
in the U.S. than in the two European countries (although the country contrast on inequality 
trends is not as strong for the 1990s as for the 1980s) (OECD 2003, pp. 41, 44).  However, 
such evidence is only weakly suggestive when age and industry have not been controlled.   
2  Acemoglu (2002), for example, has recently conjectured that wage compression in Europe 
may have motivated European employers to invest more in technology that improved the 
productivity of less skilled workers, thereby preserving higher than expected employment for 
this group. 
3  Our positing of an institutional theory of relative inequality trends can be seen as a response 
to the challenge put forward by Morris and Western (1999) for sociology to pay attention to 
recent trends in inequality, and to develop institutional theories for these trends. 
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produces a biased picture of American and European choices and outcomes.  
As will be argued below, one consequence of these omissions is an excessive 
attribution of trends in labor market outcomes to dynamic shocks as opposed to 
dynamic institutional structures. A second consequence is an inattention to dy-
namics in the structure and distribution of employment relationships, which we 
will show is essential for a complete understanding of the macrostructure and 
dynamics of inequality in Europe. 
Institutional change over the past twenty years has created important new 
sources of flexibility in European labor markets, and specifically in the labor 
market of France.  Many European countries have overcome the institutional 
resistance to wage adjustment by legislating employment flexibility. These legis-
lative acts created the possibility of a fixed term contract (FTC), and thereby 
diminished the cost of laying off permanent workers. From a formal perspective, 
the use of these contracts is restricted. In France, FTCs are currently allowed by 
law when the job in question fills a potentially temporary increase in demand, or 
when the work is inherently seasonal, or when the fixed term worker is tempo-
rarily replacing an indefinite term contract (ITC) worker who is absent from the 
labour force.  Furthermore, French employers have an incentive to give an FTC 
worker an ITC at the end of the maximum 18 month fixed term contract (includ-
ing renewals) to avoid paying a “termination tax.”4 
Yet in spite of these limitations, the employment share of FTC and temporary 
jobs has increased dramatically in France over the two recent decades, from 
barely 2% in the early eighties to about 9% in 2001. About 80% of workers’ en-
tries and exits in French establishments involve temporary contracts (Goux, 
Maurin and Pauchet 2003).  
The unified theory views institutional constraints on wage flexibility as poten-
tially pricing low-skill labor out of European labor markets. But, while these wage 
constraints are real, the introduction of FTC jobs has clearly decreased the rela-
tive cost of unskilled workers in Europe. Unskilled jobs are indeed the most 
exposed to the cyclical and seasonal variations in economic activity, and as a 
consequence, those which suffered the most from employment legislation that 
imposes rigidities on the labor market. Also, unskilled tasks are by their nature 
almost as easy for new hires as for experienced workers to perform. Conse-
quently, the low tenure of FTC workers offers no productivity disadvantages to 
the employer, while the possibility of low cost terminations offers definite reduc-
tions in the employer’s overall adjustment costs in case of cyclical downturns. 
                                            
4  The precise details of these conditions have changed somewhat over time.  Generally 
speaking, the conditions under which FTC could be used were loosened in 1985 and tight-
ened somewhat in 1990, though these tighter regulations seem to have been 
inconsequential in practice (Michon and Ramaux 1993; OECD 1999)  
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Generally speaking, FTCs have provided European employers with a new tool 
for redistributing labor adjustment costs and employment security across highly 
skilled and less skilled workers. A major hypothesis of this paper is that Euro-
pean labor markets have absorbed skill-biased technological change by 
allocating an increasingly large share of unskilled workers to flexible jobs. 
Labor adjustment costs have become all the more important and strategic 
for employers because recent decades have witnessed heightened competition 
and market instability, and changes not only in the nature of the technological 
progress, but also in its rhythm. The somewhat loosely defined “globalization” 
literature sees these changes as forces that have weakened employment secu-
rity across all industrialized countries. These forces, it is argued, have increased 
rates of job displacement and have increased the growth rate of “bad jobs” 
(Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000). They also have increased the attractive-
ness to employers of nonstandard employment that builds employment 
instability into the job itself. By so doing, employers can more easily respond to 
turbulence in demand, which is seen as characteristic of advanced economies in 
a globalizing world. Trend analyses, which document a rising density of contin-
gent jobs during the past fifteen or so years (Golden 1996; Segal and Sullivan 
1997; de Grip, Hoevenberg and Willems 1997; Estevão and Lach 2000; Leven-
son 2000), provide empirical support for this view. 
By neglecting the forces of globalization and the differences between secure 
and insecure job positions, the unified theory provides only an incomplete inter-
pretation of the differences between American and European labor market 
institutions and performance, and makes predictions that appear to be at vari-
ance with empirical observation. The unified theory’s prediction that adjustment 
to “macroeconomic shocks” occurs mainly through wage inequality and unem-
ployment rates ignores a major aspect of European adjustment, namely 
adjustment through increased use of contingent jobs. 
Our approach remedies this deficiency. We argue that European labor mar-
kets have absorbed asymmetric macroeconomic shocks not through rising wage 
inequality and falling real wages to low-skill workers (as in the U.S.), and not 
simply through adjustments in their demand for workers possessing various lev-
els of skill, but importantly through the creation of low-adjustment cost/low-
security jobs and through the allocation of an increasingly large share of low-
skilled workers to these jobs. European adjustment strategies have thereby pro-
duced rising inequality, but rising inequality in the employment security rather 
than the wage component of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we ar-
gue that skill increasingly predicts the level of employment security attached to a 
job, that is, we hypothesize growing “employment security” returns to skill in 
Europe, which parallel the rising wage returns to skill in the U.S. Thus, we see 
increases in what we have termed “generalized inequality” on both sides of the 
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Atlantic; the specific components of the employment relationship that display 
growing inequality vary, but that fact of a trend is common. 
In the next sections, we will review the empirical evidence for our claims.  
We first develop a comparative approach to the measurement of employment 
insecurity as a job attribute in France and the U.S. Then we test the key hy-
potheses underlying our approach, namely that (1) institutional change in labor 
market structure has indeed occurred in France in response to the “macroeco-
nomic shocks” described in the unified theory, (2) these institutional innovations 
have led to a genuine increase in labor market flexibility, as measured by 
changes in the distribution of jobs according to their levels of employment secu-
rity, (3) inequality in employment security has grown faster in France than in the 
U.S., even as inequality in wages has grown faster in the U.S. than in France 
and (4) employment insecurity is increasingly related to skill in France, and thus 
becomes a major and distinctive labor market response to the macroeconomic 
“shocks” described in the unified theory. Taken together, our hypotheses imply 
that ”generalized inequality” and generalized returns to skill have grown in both 
countries, but the different character of institutional flexibility in the two countries 
has caused the employment security component of the employment relationship 
to trend more strongly in France while the wage component has trended more 
strongly in the U.S. 
3. Concepts and Data 
The Definition of job insecurity in France and the US 
To test the assumption that the forces of globalization and technological change 
have impacted differently the level and distribution of job insecurity in France 
and the US, we need to formulate comparable definitions of insecure jobs in the 
two countries. In this section, we describe the main similarities and differences 
in contingent jobs and other insecure employment statuses between France and 
the U.S. 
Employment contracts are required by law in the “regulated” labor market of 
France. However, the laws concerning employment contracts have changed 
significantly in the past two decades.  The legal introduction of FTC dates back 
to 1979.  Before that time, all employment contracts in France provided protec-
tion against termination. In 1979, however, a second type of labor contract was 
legally authorized. This new contract was of limited duration and provided for 
low-termination costs, but its use was legally restricted to special circumstances; 
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it was allowable only for the replacement of temporarily absent workers and in 
the cases of seasonal activity or temporary variations in demand for the com-
pany’s product. 
Several modifications to French labor law since that date have potentially in-
fluenced that country’s distribution of employment security.  Modifications since 
1979 have alternatively tightened (in 1982), loosened (in 1986), and again tight-
ened (in 1990) the applicability of FTCs (with the direction of change varying 
systematically with the left or right orientation of French governments).  These 
changes have generally involved either the set of situations in which employers 
were permitted to use FTCs, or the tools available to the French administration 
to enforce labor contract laws.  Other changes to French labor law have also 
potentially affected the distribution of employment security in France.  In 1972, 
the legal framework for temporary help agencies was introduced.  In 1986, im-
portant changes were made concerning the termination costs a firm must pay: 
With the elimination of the "autorisation administrative de licenciements", a firm 
was allowed to lay off workers without first obtaining authorization from the 
French administration. From 1990 to 2001, there have been no significant 
changes in the legal framework for FTC. 
French labor law in effect creates four levels of attachment to the labor 
force. At the bottom is unemployment, where attachment to the labor force 
comes solely from the search activity to find a job.  The next most secure status 
is a FTC. More secure still is an ITC with low employer tenure.5 The highest 
level of security comes from an ITC with higher levels of employer tenure, or 
from a government job. Self-employment stands apart from these categories as 
a highly heterogeneous status, where employment security is correlated with 
years of tenure in the business in question. 
From a legal perspective, flexible jobs have a manifestly different standing 
in the United States than in France. In contrast to the French situation, American 
employers have no legal requirement to define the duration of a job, or even to 
sign an employment contract with a person they hire.6 Indeed, in the American 
                                            
5  The greater security of ITC workers is enforced by powerful sanctions only after a worker 
has accumulated two years of seniority.  Workers with less than six months seniority in an 
ITC job do not have the right to prior notification of layoff, while workers who are discharged 
with less than two years seniority are not entitled to severance pay (Goux, Maurin and 
Pauchet 2001).   
6  The American legal “employment at will” doctrine has been eroded in recent years by court 
decisions that see an exception to this doctrine in the cases of “public policy” “implied con-
tracts,” or “covenants of good faith.” However, the “public policy” exception is essentially a 
(partial) protection against “wrongful” discharge (e.g., firing an employee for refusing a com-
pany’s order that he perjure himself in a court of law).  The “implied contract” exception may 
see a protection against termination in the provisions of a company’s employee handbook, 
but there is no legal requirement that the company make such representations to its employ-
ees.  The “covenant of good faith” exception is the broadest challenge to the employment at 
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context there is no legal definition of a contingent job.  Instead a contingent job 
is defined behaviorally by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in more or less 
restrictive ways based on whether the worker is employed by a temporary 
agency or on a limited contract, has limited tenure, and has expectations that 
the job will last only for a fixed duration (for further details, see Polivka 1996). 
From a purely behavioral perspective, however, FTC jobs in France and 
contingent jobs in the U.S. are similar in the expectation that these jobs will ter-
minate in the near future. Employer-provided rationales for contingent jobs in the 
U.S. — the need to meet unexpected or short-term demand for labor (House-
man 2000) — are consistent with the legally allowable reasons for creating FTC 
jobs in France. Most (53%) contingent workers in the U.S. report that their jobs 
will last only until the end of their current project, 18% are hired for a fixed time 
period, 9% are temporarily replacing another worker, and 8% are seasonal 
(Hipple 2001).7 These expectations of American contingent workers concerning 
the duration of their jobs are likewise consistent with French legal conditions for 
the creation of FTC jobs. In the U.S. as in France, the distinction between “tem-
porary” and “probationary” workers is ambiguous; in practice, roughly half of all 
employers who use contingent workers indicate that they “often,” “occasionally,” 
or “sometimes” move workers from these positions into regular jobs (Houseman 
1998). Contingent jobs in the two countries are similar in one additional respect: 
the holders of these jobs sometimes work for temporary help agencies and 
sometimes are directly hired as short-term workers by the company at which 
they physically do the work.8 
Yet despite the behavioral similarity of FTC jobs in France and contingent 
jobs in the U.S., the national incidence rates and the trends in these rates are 
very different. While the BLS did not collect data explicitly about contingent jobs 
until 1995, indirect and partial evidence suggests that the use of contingent 
workers generally increased in the U.S. from 1972 until the middle 1990s (Segal 
and Sullivan 1997).9 The BLS estimated that, by its most expansive definition, 
about 4.3% of American workers were contingent in the middle 1990s, but that 
the proportion of contingent workers in the labor force has gradually declined 
                                                                                                                                
will doctrine, but “the vast majority of courts have rejected reading such an implied covenant 
into the employment relationships.” (Muhl 2001, p. 10). 
7  Note that the CPS survey is in February, a time when the seasonal workforce is relatively 
small. 
8  In the U.S., roughly 25% of contingent workers are employed by temporary help agencies, 
with the rest being either direct short-term hires or self-employed short-term contractors.  In 
France, the temporary help agency business is actually slightly larger (in proportion to the 
work force) than it is in the U.S. In 1996, temporary work business revenues in France were 
$11.3 billion, vs. $47.1 billion in the U.S.  This ratio is somewhat larger than is the ratio of 
population in the two countries (Si Review 2002; see also OECD 1999). 
9  The share of total employment provided by the temporary help services industry in particular 
rose from 0.3% in 1972 to more than 1.8% in 1995 (Segal and Sullivan 1997). 
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between 1995 and 2001 (Hipple 2001; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001).10  With 
the loosening of employment security regulations in the 1980s, French utilization 
increased dramatically between 1982 and 1991, and has continued to increase 
during the 1990s; the proportion of French workers holding temporary jobs in-
creased from about 6% in the mid 1990s to about 10% in the late 1990s and is 
now much higher than the American figure (Bloch and Estrade, 1999). Also, 
about 80% of all new hires into French for-profit firms were hired into FTC jobs 
(Goux, Maurin and Pauchet 2001). 
One possible interpretation of the large and increasing cross-national differ-
ence in these percentages is that French contingent jobs do not correspond in 
their level of job security to American contingent jobs. If the different short-term 
career outcomes of contingent and non-contingent jobs in the French labor mar-
ket were relatively small, then the higher level of employment security inequality 
in France suggested by the above-mentioned statistics would not correspond to 
actual inequality in the career experiences of French workers.  Therefore, it is 
important to establish the consequences of working in jobs with different levels 
of employment security in the two countries. In the next sections, we compare 
the employment and wage consequences of three distinct insecure job statuses:  
unemployment, working in a contingent job, and working in a non-contingent job 
with one year or less of tenure with the employer. Once we have established the 
comparability of the behavioral consequences of these job categories, we then 
proceed to a test of the primary hypotheses of this paper. 
Data and Measures 
We use data on contingent jobs from the Contingent and Alternative Work Ar-
rangements Supplement to the Current Population Survey in 1995, 1997, 1999 
and 2001 to analyze the cross-sectional distribution and very recent trends in 
the United States.11 For the French case we analyze distribution and trends over 
a longer period of time with the Labor Force Surveys for 1982, 1991, 1995, and 
2001, all of which contain information on the type of labor contract (including 
FTC). We use data from the NLSY79 for the years 1994-2000 to analyze the 
consequences of insecure employment on subsequent employment, wages, and 
                                            
10  The most expansive definition of contingent work used by the BLS (“estimate 3”) includes 
self-employed workers and independent contractors with tenure and expectation of contin-
ued employment of one year or less, as well as temporary workers and contract workers, 
regardless of their current tenure.  Unlike more restrictive estimates, estimate 3 does not re-
quire that the worker expect their jobs to end within one year.  The job is contingent so long 
as the employee views the job as temporary for reasons related to the structure of the job.  
For further details, see Polivka (1996). 
11  The CPS did not begin using questions designed to measure contingent jobs until 1995.   
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wage growth for American workers.12 To analyze individual-level outcomes in 
France, we use the Formation et Qualification Professionnelle (FQP) Survey.  
The FQP survey was conducted in May 1993 by the French Institut National de 
la Statistique et des Etudes Economique (INSEE). It covers a sample of 18,000 
people between the ages of 20 and 65, is representative of the French popula-
tion, and provides information on employment status in May 1988 and May 
1993, total compensation (earnings plus benefits) in calendar year 1992, and 
other relevant factors such as education (highest degree), age, occupation, type 
of contract (e.g., FTC, ITC), and the employer's industry. Sample members of 
the NSLY were between 29 and 37 years old in 1994. To create a comparable 
analysis, we analyzed career outcomes for French workers in this same age 
range.13 
The French definition of contingent job includes all wage and salaried em-
ployees who do not hold a regular indefinite-term contract, which includes 
workers under fixed-term contracts (including seasonal contracts), workers sent 
by temporary help agencies, workers with temporary contracts in the public sec-
tor (i.e., contractuels, auxiliaires, vacataires, pigistes, etc.), and trainees and 
workers who benefit from subsidized contracts for job market integration or trial 
periods. The 1994, 1996, and 1998 waves of the NLSY79 contain questions that 
allow an operationalization of contingent work similar to that used in recent BLS 
studies (Polivka 1996; Hipple 1998, 2001). We used these questions to opera-
tionalize contingent work as those workers who said they were a temporary 
worker sent by a temporary help agency, or that they were a temporary worker 
hired directly by the company.  Our analysis of CPS data made use of the BLS 
definition 3 of contingent workers (self-employed and independent contractor 
workers with tenure and expectation of continued employment of less than one 
year, plus temporary workers and contract workers regardless of their tenure or 
expectation of future employment), but was modified to exclude the self-
employed to correspond more closely with the French definition. 
To make industry measures comparable, we classified workers in both 
countries into the 17 industry categories from the International Standard Indus-
trial Classification (ISIC). We coded education in both countries into the 
CASMIN (Comparative Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) categories (Müller et 
al. 1989; Shavit and Müller 1998). The full set of categories consists of: (1a) In-
adequately completed general education, (1b) General elementary education, 
(1c) Compulsory elementary education and basic vocational qualification, (2a) 
                                            
12  Unlike the NLSY79 data used in previous studies (e.g., Ferber and Waldfogel 1998, 2000), 
the 1994, 1996, and 1998 waves of the NLSY79 contain explicit measures of whether a 
sample member worked in a contingent job. 
13  According to data from the CPS (Hipple 2001), 26% of all contingent workers in the U.S. 
were between 25 and 34 years old, and another 18.5% were between 35 and 44 years old.  
Thus, the age range covered by the NLSY79 contains a numerically significant proportion of 
all contingent workers in the U.S. 
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Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification or intermediate general qualifi-
cation and vocational qualification, (2b) Secondary, intermediate general 
qualification, (2c_gen) Full general maturity certificate (secondary school), 
(2c_voc) Full vocational maturity certificate or general maturity certificate and 
vocational qualification, (3a) Lower tertiary education, and (3b) Higher tertiary 
education (including the successful completion of a traditional academically-
oriented university education). The operationalization of these categories for the 
U.S. and France are indicated in the table notes of this paper, with the details of 
the French operationalization available in Maurin and Goux (1998). 
4. Results – Comparing Contingent Jobs in France and the 
U.S. 
Because we have shorter-interval panels for the American case, we analyze 
employment consequences there over both a two and a four year period. The 
data for France allow us to measure employment effects five years after the re-
spondent’s May 1988 employment status. We used a propensity score analysis 
to estimate the effects of employment status on job outcomes. A propensity 
score analysis matches sample individuals in a particular “treatment” state with 
other sample individuals who have the same probability of being in the treatment 
state but who are in fact in the “control” state. For analyzing the instability impli-
cations of unemployment, the treatment state is unemployed and the control 
state is employed. For analyzing the instability implications of being in a contin-
gent job, the treatment state is contingent job and the control state was non-
contingent job.  For analyzing the instability implications of having low tenure in 
a non-contingent job, the treatment state was low tenure in a non-contingent job 
and the control state was higher tenure levels in a non-contingent job. Appendix 
A provides more details on the matching methods used in this paper.  
The three panels of table 1 compare outcomes two years in the future be-
tween American contingent and non-contingent workers, unemployed and 
employed workers, and low tenure and higher-tenure workers, respectively.  
Within each panel, the first column compares differences in the proportion of 
workers in the treatment and comparison group who were employed at time 2.  
The second column reports average differences in wage levels at time 2 condi-
tional on the matched cases actually working at time 2. The third column 
compares differences in wage growth between times 1 and 2, conditional on 
working at both times 1 and 2. Column 4 compares differences in the change in 
log wage, conditional on working at both times 1 and 2.  Columns 5, 6, and 7 
contain estimates of wage outcomes, wage change, and change in log wage 
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both for cases who were and who were not working at time 2.14 By setting the 
wage at zero for those not working, columns 5, 6, and 7 provide an estimate of 
the combined wage effect that is produced by differences in wages for those 
working and the lack of a wage for those not working.15  Because workers who 
were unemployed at time 1 have no wage for that time, we do not estimate the 
average wage change effects of unemployment. 
The results in table 1 show a lower probability of employment two years 
later for contingent workers relative to noncontingent workers in the U.S. For 
comparison, the second panel shows the effect of unemployment on employ-
ment two years later. The effect of unemployment on future employment is 
larger than the effect of contingent status on future employment for men, while 
for women the reverse pattern holds.  These two patterns cancel each other; the 
average effects of unemployment and contingent job status on future employ-
ment in the two-gender sample are approximately the same size. 
The third panel demonstrates that low tenure in a noncontingent job is also 
an insecure employment status, with an average impact on future employment 
that is about one-third the magnitude of contingent job status or unemployment.  
We interpret this effect as due partly to the probationary status of many workers 
in low-tenure situations, though the determination and termination of a “bad 
match” can sometimes be made by the employee as well as by the employer.  
The estimated effect of low tenure on future employment provides a more nu-
anced interpretation of the effect of contingent job status; about one third of the 
negative employment effect of contingent job status on future employment may 
arise from the lack of a strong attachment to the job that is typical for low-tenure 
workers, while the other two-thirds may be attributable to the explicitly temporary 
character of contingent jobs. 
The contrasts between the three insecure statuses change noticeably when 
the outcome is wages as opposed to employment. Contingent workers (espe-
cially men) experience lower wages two years later than do otherwise 
comparable non-contingent workers. There is little evidence in the propensity 
score analyses that contingent job holders face lower rates of wage growth; 
rather the results suggest that their working in a contingent job puts them (at 
                                            
14  In a small proportion (less than 2%) of the NLSY79 cases, workers in contingent jobs re-
ported wages that were either very low relative to the minimum wage, or were very high.  
Given the heterogeneity found in this group of workers in the American context, some of 
these values may be true, while others are probably errors in the data. To keep these values 
from unduly affecting the comparison, we capped wages in 1996 constant dollars below 
$3/hr at $3/hr and those above $100/hr at $100/hr (in fact, this transformation had no qualita-
tively significant effect on our estimates). 
15  For the change in log wage analysis, those not working were assigned a wage of $1 (which 
implies a log wage of zero).  Because we do median comparisons for analyses involving the 
change in log wage, the results are unaffected by the specific positive wage value that we 
choose for those not working in the change in log wage analysis. 
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least temporarily) on a lower but parallel wage track than otherwise comparable 
noncontingent workers. A more revealing comparison, however, is with low-
tenure holders of noncontingent jobs, who, as table 1 shows, have higher aver-
age wage growth than more senior workers. Like low-tenure noncontingent 
workers, contingent workers also generally have low tenure in their jobs.  Unlike 
low-tenure noncontingent workers, however, contingent workers cannot expect 
higher wage growth to compensate for the risk of higher employment instability. 
In short, contingent workers are disadvantaged relative to low-tenure noncontin-
gent workers in both future employment prospects and wage growth. They are 
less disadvantaged than the unemployed however, whose risk of future em-
ployment instability is as great as is the risk faced by contingent workers, and 
whose wage penalties appear to be even greater. 
Generally speaking, the consequences of insecure employment relation-
ships four years in the future show the same pattern as two years in the future, 
but the size of effects is somewhat diminished. Table 2 shows that the effects of 
both contingent status and unemployment on employment status four years in 
the future are negative but no longer statistically significant. The low-tenure ef-
fects on future employment status are of similar magnitude as the effects of 
contingent status or unemployment though they retain statistical significance; it 
is probably the larger sample size for the low-tenure analysis that accounts for 
the difference in standard errors for these estimates. Unemployment continues 
to have a negative effect on wages in the four-year as in the two-year analyses, 
while low-tenure status continues to have a positive effect. The effects of contin-
gent status on wage levels four-years in the future remain fairly similar in 
magnitude to the two-year effects, but they are not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels. The effects of contingent job status continue to lie between the 
other two statuses, with unemployment offering the worst prospects and low-
tenure status offering the best. 
Having established the American case as a point of comparison, we then 
performed a propensity score analysis of employment and compensation out-
comes using the French data over a five year time period (for employment) and 
over a four year time period for compensation. The results are presented in table 
3. The employment consequences of being in a contingent job in France appear 
somewhat worse than are the consequences in the U.S. French contingent 
workers have greater employment risks than do French low-tenure workers.  
The point estimate for contingent job status in France is even larger than the 
point estimate for unemployment, but table 3 suggests that the ordering of these 
two insecure statuses depends on gender. Specifically, the future employment 
risks from contingent job status are greater than the risks from current unem-
ployment status for French men, while the reverse is true for French women.  
The French five-year results look rather similar to the American two-year results 
in terms of risk patterns. This pattern suggests that insecure employment 
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statuses generate future employment risk in both countries, but that the risk 
tends to decay faster in the U.S. than it does in France. 
Recall that the French data provides information about yearly compensation 
rather than wages. Similarly to the analyses of U.S. data reported above, we 
estimated both the mean compensation difference between the treated and con-
trol samples, and also the median difference in log compensation differences 
between each matched case from the treatment and from the control groups.16  
Because the measure of compensation applies to the calendar year prior to the 
survey time, we estimated compensation effects unconditional on employment 
status at the survey time. Because no information on compensation in the treat-
ment year (1988) is available in the French data, we can estimate the effects of 
the treatment on compensation levels, but not on change in compensation, as 
we did for the American sample. 
According to the propensity score analyses, the effects of contingent status 
on future compensation in France are somewhat more negative than in the U.S. 
For example, the estimated cost of contingent job status for French male work-
ers (FF22,790 per year four years later, or about $4,272) is greater than the 
American result (US$1.44/hr, which equals about $2,880 for a full-time wor-
ker).17 These differences in the point estimates derive from cross-national 
differences in the wage/compensation effects for women in the two countries. If 
we focus solely on men, the French effect (FF18,760 per year four years later, 
or about $3,520) is actually smaller than is the American effect ($2.77/hr or 
about $5,440 for a full-time worker). The standard errors are wide enough, how-
ever, that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the male effects and also the 
combined gender effects are of similar magnitude in the two countries.  The 
French results share the American pattern of showing more negative average 
earnings effects from unemployment than from contingent jobs, with the best 
wage outcomes arising from the status of low-tenure noncontingent worker.  
Thus for France, like the U.S., contingent jobs appear to be an insecure labor 
force status that is similar to, but not as disabling, as unemployment, with more 
negative effects for contingent jobs than for low-tenure noncontingent jobs both 
in terms of future employment prospects and in terms of future compensation. 
                                            
16   Column 3 of table 11 allows one to interpret compensation differences in percentage terms 
as opposed to the absolute differences (in French francs) reported in column 2.  Note that 
these differences in log compensation between the treatment and the control group involve 
wage levels, and thus are not directly comparable to the differences in the change in log 
compensation over two or four years between the treatment and the control group that are 
reported in tables 9 and 10 for U.S. workers. 
17  The exchange rate was FF5.3346 per U.S. dollar on May 3, 1993 (source: Bank of Canada). 
The most comparable estimate for American workers would be somewhat higher than the 
2000* $1.44 or 2000* $2.77/hour figures used in the text, because this figures assume that 
there are no differences in hours worked in the future year for workers who were or who 
were not in a contingent job in the treatment year. 
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In summary, the main difference between the outcomes of insecure employment 
statuses in the two countries is the higher future employment insecurity risk for 
French than for American contingent workers. Clearly, the behavioral impact of 
contingent job status in France is at least as consequential for short to medium 
term career outcomes as in the U.S. We therefore proceed next to examine 
whether French labor markets have shown a flexible response to the macroeco-
nomic shocks generating wage inequality in the U.S. by stimulating rising 
inequality in employment security instead. 
5. Results — Testing the Generalized Perspective on Ine-
quality Trends 
The key behavioral hypothesis of the generalized theory is that while U.S. labor 
markets have responded to macroeconomic shocks via growing wage inequality, 
continental European countries like France have absorbed recent asymmetric 
shocks to labor demand neither through unemployment or wage inequalities, but 
through increasingly large inequalities in employment protection. American 
trends in wage inequality are already well documented in the literature (see e.g. 
Katz and Autor 1999 or Morris and Western 1999). Furthermore, comparative 
evidence demonstrates that the trends in wage inequality in the U.S. are much 
stronger than are trends in wage inequality in continental Europe (Freeman and 
Katz 1995; Acemoglu 2002). 
Wage trends for France in particular do not show rising inequality or declin-
ing real wages for low skill workers (Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux 1999).  
According to the unified theory, French labor markets should compensate for 
their rigid wage structure via declining employment of unskilled workers.  How-
ever, Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999) have shown that during the crucial 
decade of the 1980s, when American relative wages for low skilled workers 
dropped considerably and when French relative wages remain highly stable, the 
pattern of relative employment growth for low skill workers was very similar in 
France and the U.S.  This pattern does not correspond to the unified theory’s 
prediction. The conclusion of Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) is that wage 
flexibility alone cannot account for the employment dynamics observed in west-
ern economies and that an explanation for the relative employment 
performances of the U.S. and Europe is still lacking. 
Our generalized theory of inequality trends proposes to explain this para-
doxical result. We argue that the macroeconomic shocks discussed above have 
in fact driven an overall increase in job insecurity (i.e., an overall increase in the 
share of low-adjustment costs/low-security jobs) in France in exactly the same 
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way as they have generated an increase in low-paid jobs and stagnant average 
real wages in the U.S. We test our key hypotheses by first comparing trends and 
the contemporary distribution of insecure employment statuses in the two coun-
tries. Then we examine trends in skill-based inequality of employment security 
and analyze whether it is the experience of low-skilled workers that was espe-
cially affected by the macroeconomic shocks discussed above. 
The Overall Distribution of Employment Insecurity in France  
and the U.S. 
As we have already noted above, unemployment rates trended down in the U.S. 
from the early 1980s to the middle 1990s and, while rising somewhat during the 
present recession, have remained lower than European levels.18  Also as noted 
above, overall rates of contingent job utilization declined in the U.S. between 
1995 and 2001, while overall rates continued to rise in France. Table 4, which 
disaggregates these trends by industry, shows rates of contingent job use in 
American industries for 1995 and 2001, while table 5 shows comparable rates 
for France.  Tables 4 and 5 show that contingent jobs were already more heavily 
utilized by 1991 in France than in the U.S. labor market of 1995 in most service 
sector industries, in manufacturing, and in construction. In the succeeding ten 
years, rates of utilization of contingent jobs continued to surge in France while 
remaining relatively stable or even declining somewhat in the U.S. 
Table 6 shows the proportion of workers in three categories of employment 
insecurity according to labor force survey data for 2001 by age.  These statistics 
demonstrate three important facts. First, workers in both France and the U.S. 
move into increasingly secure employment statuses over the life course, but in-
security remains a problem for a considerable fraction of workers even in the 
oldest age range. Second, the overall proportion of insecure workers is higher in 
France than in the U.S. at all age ranges. Third, the breakdown of workers 
across the three insecure statuses differs considerably in the two countries. De-
spite the notably downward sloping gradient in unemployment risk, workers in 
France had sharply higher unemployment rates than did American workers. Fur-
thermore, despite the even more sharply downward sloping gradient in 
contingent jobs, a much higher proportion of workers in France were in contin-
gent jobs than in the U.S. If we limited attention to these two insecure statuses, 
we would conclude that the risk of being in an insecure employment status in 
France was three times as high as in the United States. 
                                            
18 U.S. unemployment rates were 7.4% in 1984, 5.6% in 1995, 4.2% in 1999, and 4.8% in 2001.  
French unemployment rates were 9.7% in 1984, 11.7% in 1995, 11.3% in 1999, and 8.5% in 
2001. 
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The factor that partially equalizes the aggregate risk of insecurity between the 
two countries is the proportion of workers with low tenure. As table 6 shows, the 
proportion of workers who are in low-tenure non-contingent jobs is almost twice 
as high in the American as in the French labor market.19  The relatively high rate 
of low-tenure workers in the U.S. comes from higher rates of separation (for both 
voluntary and involuntary reasons) in the United States as compared with 
France among low-tenure workers. OECD statistics (1997, table 5.10) show 
separation rates for all workers with less than one year of tenure with the em-
ployer were 65.9% in the U.S. as compared with 41.6% in France. The 
difference in these rates creates a larger pool of low-tenure non-contingent 
workers in the U.S. than in France. However, the larger quantity of low-tenure 
non-contingent workers in the U.S. than in France is not large enough to offset 
the aggregate greater employment insecurity in France stemming from the lar-
ger quantity of French workers in unemployment and in contingent jobs.  
Furthermore, existing evidence (Neumark, Polsky and Hansen 2000; Gottschalk 
and Moffitt 2000) suggests that the rising trends in job insecurity in the U.S. dur-
ing the 1990s were modest compared with the sharp rise in contingent jobs in 
the French labor market.20 
                                            
19   Our findings are consistent with published OECD (1997) statistics, which come from the 
European Community Labour Force Survey for France and the CPS for the U.S.  They show 
that average tenure on the job for French workers aged 25-44 was 9.0 years in 1995 vs. 6.2 
years in the United States. They also show that 15% of all French workers in 1995 (regard-
less of age) had less than one year of tenure on the job, vs. 26% in the U.S.  Finally, and 
again consistent with our data, they show a rising risk of insecurity in France, with 12.2% of 
the French labor force having less than one year of tenure in 1985 vs. 14.4% in 1995. 
20  One final relative source of insecurity needs to be considered, of course, and that concerns 
high-tenured non-contingent workers. The main risks to workers in this category come from 
job displacement.  These risks in the aggregate have been well studied in the American case 
through the Displaced Worker Surveys. According to the 1998 Displaced Worker Survey 
(see Hipple 1999, table 3), the two-year rate of job displacement in the U.S. in the middle 
1990s was about 4% on average and about 2.8% for those with more than 3 years of tenure, 
which would correspond to a rate of about 1.5% per year. Hipple (1999, table 3) found a two 
year displacement rate of 5.5% for those with fewer than 3 years of job tenure. For higher 
tenured groups, the two-year displacement rate was: 3.7% (for 3-4 years of tenure), 3.3% 
(for 5-9 years of tenure), 2.4% (for 10-14 years of tenure), and 2.5% (for 15-19 years of ten-
ure). While precisely comparable statistics do not exist for France, Givord and Maurin (2001) 
have analyzed the yearly rate of transition between employment and unemployment using 
the French Labor Force surveys.  Whereas the yearly risk of job loss for workers with at least 
a year of seniority in the 1984-1988 period was about 1.6% for workers with at least a high 
school diploma and 3.1% for workers with less than a high school diploma, the yearly rates 
for these two groups had risen to 2.6% and 3.6% per year, respectively for the 1993-1998 
period (the transition rates reported in Givord and Maurin (2002) by should be adjusted by 
0.9, because, as they estimate, about 90% of these transitions are involuntary.)  The U.S. 
rates exclude firings, which are included in the French statistics (in a firing, the job continues 
to exist, but the incumbent is terminated).  Nonetheless, such an adjustment would still leave 
the French job loss rates for more senior workers at least as high as the American rates.  
Furthermore, it is likely that the French rates underestimate displacement because some 
workers who are displaced find new jobs without an intervening spell of unemployment 
(Margolis 2000). 
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Skill-Based Inequality of Employment Security in France  
and the U.S. 
Next we test our key trend hypothesis, namely that the institutional innovations 
in French labor markets produced rising skill-based inequality of employment 
security as the primary counterpart to the rising skill-based inequality of wages 
in the U.S. Tables 7 and 8 provide an empirical test for our key hypotheses. Ta-
ble 7 focuses on the population of French male workers observed in the French 
LFS in 1990, 1996, 2002. The first column shows the results of a logistic regres-
sion where the dependent variable is unemployment and where the independent 
variables are age, education (measured using the CASMIN categories as de-
scribed in Shavit and Müller 1998 and the notes to tables 7 and 8), and dummy 
variables for survey date. As it turns out, the regression reveals neither signifi-
cant nor systematic trends in the inequality of unemployment risks across the 
different categories of workers. Significant inequalities in unemployment risk 
across educational level and age do exist, but these inequalities did not increase 
between 1990 and 2002. In particular, the differences between the log odds of 
college graduates (level 3b) and high-school dropout (1a) are virtually the same 
in 1990, 1996 and 2002. 
The second column of Table 7 focuses on the population of male workers 
who hold a job and shows the results of a logistic regression where the depend-
ent variable is whether the worker held a contingent job and where the 
independent variables are the same as in the first model, plus a set of industry 
dummy variables. Consistent with our hypotheses, the regression shows a sig-
nificant increase in the probability of being contingent over time.  Also consistent 
with our hypotheses, the results show that this increase is much more significant 
for non-educated workers than for educated ones. Holding age and industry 
constant, the difference between the log odds of college graduates and high-
school dropouts being contingent workers increased significantly by about 0.6 
(which corresponds to an increase of 1.8 in the relative odds). Meanwhile, the 
difference between the log odds of college graduates and high-school graduates 
(level 2) being contingent workers increased by about 0.4 (or an increase of 1.5 
in the relative odds). 
The third column of Table 7 focuses on the population of male workers who 
hold non-contingent jobs and shows the results of a logistic regression where 
the dependent variable is whether the worker is low-seniority and where the in-
dependent variables are the same as in the second model. As discussed above, 
low-seniority workers are much less protected in France than high-seniority 
ones, even when they hold permanent contracts.  Holding age and industry con-
stant, the regression shows a significant increase in the odds of being low-
seniority for the least educated workers. Holding age and industry constant, the 
difference between the log odds of low-seniority status for college graduates and 
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high-school dropouts increased by about 0.5 and the difference between the log 
odds of college graduates and high-school graduates increased by about 0.3. 
Table 8 shows that the regressions reveal similar trends for women as for 
men. We do not find any systematic trend in the determinants of being unem-
ployed. Specifically, the two groups of women who have been least affected by 
the general increase in unemployment risks are the most and the least educated 
(i.e., college graduates and high-school dropouts). In contrast, the increase in 
the probability of holding either contingent jobs or (poorly protected) low-tenure 
non-contingent jobs grows differentially for low–educated workers. 
Taken together, the findings in tables 7 and 8 show an increasingly large 
proportion of jobs with low security are held by low-educated workers in France.  
To put it another way, French employers, who were not able to reduce the rela-
tive wages of low-skill workers as were American employers, instead 
increasingly concentrated these low skill workers in jobs with low-adjustment 
costs. 
Because the concept of the contingent job is relatively new (Polivka and 
Nardone 1989), there are no data available for a trend analysis across the same 
set of years in the U.S. From 1995 onwards, it is possible to measure the share 
and distribution of contingent jobs across skill categories in the American labor 
force with the Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements Supplement from 
the CPS.  Because of the short span of time covered by the American surveys 
(coupled with the fact that 2001 is a recession year), we cannot definitively ad-
dress the shape of trends in skill-based inequality with these data.21  However, 
we can use these data to address the extent to which allocation to contingent 
and low-tenure jobs in the U.S. is done on the basis of education. 
Tables 9 and 10 contain our results for male and females, respectively.  
They provide Wald tests showing that the interactions between education and 
survey year never reach the 0.05 significance level for American males, despite 
the large sample sizes.  Unemployment is heavily skill-biased in the United Sta-
tes; the probability for the lowest skill workers being unemployed is much higher 
than for high school or college graduates.  The same is true in France, but the 
U.S. labor market differs from the French labor markets in showing a big gradi-
ent in the probability of unemployment between secondary and tertiary educated 
workers. 
The U.S. is also similar to France in that workers with less than a secondary 
school diploma have a higher probability of being in a contingent job relative to 
workers with a high school degree.  However, the U.S. differs from France in the 
                                            
21  Fully interactive specifications involving education and survey year are available upon re-
quest from the authors. 
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nonsystematic relationship between education and contingent job status.  Table 
9 shows that male workers with some college were as likely to be in a contingent 
job as were workers with 9-11 years of high school.  This table also shows that 
college educated male workers in the U.S. had the same probability of being in a 
contingent job as high school educated workers. Table 9 also shows that there 
is no systematic relationship between education and having low tenure in a non-
contingent job in the U.S.  U.S. males with only a 9th-11th grade education are 
more likely to have low-tenure status in a non-contingent job than are high 
school educated workers, but there is no difference in the probability of being 
low tenure for high school and college educated workers. This lack of difference 
contrasts strongly with the French case. Furthermore, there is no evidence of 
systematic trends in the effects of skill on employment insecurity in the U.S. (see 
the Wald tests in Table 9); which again contrasts with the growing skill gradient 
in France. To summarize, the effects of skill on employment insecurity in the 
U.S. are not systematic, and there are no systematic trends in the effects of skill 
in the American data. In contrast, skill clearly increases employment security in 
France, and this skill gradient has been growing.  
Table 10 shows the relationship between skill and employment security for 
American women. The pattern of coefficients in the unemployment model is 
similar for the two genders. The same can be said for the contingent job model.  
In this latter case, our statistical analysis actually shows strong interactions be-
tween survey year and education.  Part of this is due to a sudden reduction in 
the probability of college educated women being in contingent jobs in 2001 rela-
tive to 1995, 1997 or 1999, and partly to a rise in the probability of being in a 
contingent job for female workers with less than a high school degree in 2001 
relative to the earlier years. Whether this shift is a trend or a consequence of the 
post-2000 U.S. recession is not answerable with these data. Finally, the pattern 
of low-seniority employment for American female workers is if anything even 
more skill biased, though, as with males, there is no evidence that the pattern 
has changed over time. 
The results of our statistical analysis demonstrate two central differences 
between labor force trends in France and the U.S. First, the proportion of the 
labor force that suffered employment insecurity either directly through unem-
ployment or through working in an insecure job was trending up faster in France 
than in the U.S. during the 1990s. Second, the effect of low education on the 
probability of being located in an insecure employment status was also trending 
up in France. While there is weak evidence of recent upward trends in the effect 
of low-skill on being in a contingent job for American women, the trends are 
more systematic and long-lasting in France, encompassing both low-tenure work 
and contingent jobs for both male and female French workers. 
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6. Discussion 
In their still contemporary review of the literature on rising earnings inequality in 
the U.S., Morris and Western (1999, p. 642) argued that “market explanations 
dominate research on rising inequality,” and that while institutional explanations 
have received some attention, “the focus has been narrow, restricted largely to 
the two major wage-setting institutions: the minimum wage and unions.” Their 
review article primarily addressed the literature for American trends in inequality, 
which they described in terms of “unresolved debates” and “few concrete an-
swers.” In order to shed light on these debates, we have taken a comparative 
approach, which allows greater attention to institutional variation and change as 
potential explanatory factors. Our particular focus has not been on wage setting 
institutions, but rather on institutions that determine employment flexibility.  
In the American context, it is difficult to distinguish “institutional” from market 
determinants of employment flexibility, because constraints on an employer’s 
staffing strategy are relatively minor. In the broader international context, how-
ever, constraints are more evident. Thus, our comparative strategy allows an 
examination of the effects of an “institutional interaction” concerning employment 
flexibility and wage-setting on inequality trends within a globalizing macroeco-
nomic environment. 
Our approach emphasizes the importance of a broad perspective on the 
employment relationship when trying to explain societal and market trends.  The 
unified theory builds from two dominant characteristics of the employment rela-
tionship, namely employment and wages, and constructs an explanation that 
emphasizes macro-level tradeoffs between levels of employment and wage dis-
tributions as a response to technologically-based changes in the relationship 
between productivity and skill, coupled with the possibility of institutional con-
straints on labor market adjustment. But this effort founders on the failure of 
empirical analysis to find a differential employment response between the U.S. 
and European countries that would offset the manifestly different wage response 
between the U.S. and Europe. Our approach accounts for this anomaly by em-
phasizing the dynamic nature of the employment relationship, and by attending 
to institutional innovation in the control of European employers over the terms of 
the employment contract, and the price they must pay to gain dynamic flexibility 
over the size and composition of their workforces. 
We certainly do not argue that European labor markets have achieved the 
flexibility of the American labor market. Rather, it is the restricted character of 
innovation in Europe that creates the distinctive inequality trends on both sides 
of the Atlantic. Importantly, our approach overcomes the problems identified by 
Krueger and Pischke (1997) or Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) by demon-
strating an employment response in France that offsets the lack of a wage 
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response to the changing demand for and value of skill in industrialized labor 
markets. 
Our approach shows how the French labor market absorbed the recent 
macroeconomic shocks that arguably generated a surge of inequality in the 
American labor market. French employers responded to macroeconomic shocks 
through a significant change in the relative protection of the jobs held by the dif-
ferent groups of workers even as the wage structure remained relatively stable.  
As it turns out, relative wages are not the only determinant of the relative de-
mand and supply for labor, and wage flexibility is not the only institution for labor 
market clearing. Another key ingredient appears to be the relative level of em-
ployment protection attached to jobs. On the demand side, more protected jobs 
correspond to higher adjustment costs which decrease the demand from em-
ployers. On the supply side, more protected jobs correspond to higher 
permanent income, which increase the supply from workers.  French institutions 
make it relatively difficult to absorb skill-biased shocks through changes in the 
structure of relative wages, but modifications to these institutions have allowed 
employers to respond to these shocks by reallocating labor across jobs to pro-
duce a relative decrease in the employment protection of low skilled workers. 
The unified theory sees a trade-off between wage inequalities and employ-
ment growth. In this paper, we propose an alternative perspective that sees the 
main difference between American and European responses to recent macro-
economic shocks not in the degree of institutional tolerance for inequality, but 
rather in the type of inequality that is tolerated as a market strategy for adjusting 
to shocks. In particular, the results of this paper demonstrate that the distribution 
of insecure job positions across workers is much more unequal in a typical con-
tinental European country like France than in the U.S. In particular, job insecurity 
in France is much more concentrated among the young workers and the low-
skilled workers. American workers in contrast face a more diffuse form of inse-
curity. 
Our results also demonstrate that the increase in job insecurity over the last 
decades has been much more significant and unequally distributed in France 
than in the U.S. Most notably, the rise in job insecurity has been much more sig-
nificant for the least skilled French workers than for the most skilled ones. The 
relative job security of highly skilled workers has increased the same way as the 
relative wages of highly skilled workers. This trend can be interpreted as a direct 
consequence of the interaction between the flexible employment regulations 
implemented in France (as in most European countries) in the eighties and the 
recent macroeconomic shocks emphasized by the unified theory. In combination 
with other work, our research challenges the view that unemployment is the 
main mechanisms through which European labor markets have absorbed 
asymmetric shocks to their demand for labor. 
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There is an important normative as well as positive implication of the research 
reported here.  Much of the comparative literature on labor markets contains an 
explicit or implicit premise that Europeans are less tolerant of inequality than are 
Americans. This tolerance is expressed not just as a matter of public opinion, 
but as stronger support for labor unions and for a political constellation that 
makes it difficult even for right-leaning governments to implement policies that 
increase social inequality.  Our findings suggest that this view is too simple.  The 
differences between the American and French institutions are plausibly not dif-
ferences in the degree of tolerance for inequalities, but in the nature of the 
inequalities that are tolerated. The true contrast is not between efficient America 
and egalitarian Europe, but rather between an America where employers have 
substantial freedom to structure individual employment relationships and a 
Europe where egalitarian tendencies are expressed more in terms of relative 
equality of compensation than relative equality in the form of labor market par-
ticipation. One might argue that Europe is more egalitarian than America, but 
that European institutions recognize that not all forms of equality can be opti-
mized simultaneously (cf. Swensen 1989), and thus show increased tolerance 
for inequality in some areas as a way of protecting equality in other areas. 
While advancing our understanding of the relative trends in France and the 
U.S., this paper does not address other important aspects of the problem. First 
and foremost, the empirical question of the generalizability of results to other 
European countries must be addressed. In addition to France, temporary jobs 
accounted for more than half of total employment growth during the 1990s in 
Austria and Italy, while temporary jobs actually accounted for all the job growth 
in Germany (permanent jobs in Germany declined by 0.5% per year) (OECD 
2003). However, temporary jobs accounted for less than 1/5 of total employment 
gains in Sweden, while temporary employment actually fell in Denmark at the 
expense of permanent jobs (OECD 2003). We think it probable that variations in 
labor market institutions and in the industrial composition of the economy will 
generate different responses to common trends even if the underlying techno-
logical adaptation is similar, which itself is a disputable point (Acemoglu 2002).   
Second, it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop or test alternative 
explanations for the relatively low level of economic and employment growth in 
Europe. But there clearly exist several possible explanations which do not con-
tradict our perspective of partially flexible European labor markets and rising 
inequality of a particular type in Europe. These explanations include, for exam-
ple, the possibility of relatively low level of R&D investments in Europe and a 
deepening technological gap between Europe and the U.S. 
Finally, while our paper plausibly accounts for differences in trends between 
the U.S. and Europe, it is not intended to address directly the sources of rising 
wage inequality within the U.S.  Our research, however, does suggest the plau-
sibility of new institutional approaches to this question. Most research on 
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American wage inequality takes for granted that American labor markets are 
flexible, and looks for explanations in terms of supply and demand shocks that 
are worked out within a flexible labor market. Our comparative approach, how-
ever, emphasizes that fairly subtle forms of institutional innovation can have 
major impacts on labor market performance and worker outcomes.  Our results 
suggest that institutional changes in the wage-setting mechanisms even of a 
generally flexible labor market such as that found in the U.S. might be an impor-
tant component of the explanation for U.S. specific trends. The research 
challenge is to devise studies that can subject such institutional theories to em-
pirical test. 
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Appendix: Matching Methodology 
We did the matching several ways in order to ensure the robustness of the 
matching procedure. We first matched workers in the treatment state with work-
ers in the control state based on a Mahalanobis-metric matching on gender, 
survey year, and the estimated probability of being in the treatment state, and on 
the time interval in question (either 1994→1996, 1996→1998, or 1998→2000).  
In a second procedure, we used caliper matching where we required a potential 
match to be within ¼ of a standard deviation of the treated case’s estimated 
propensity score, and where we forced perfect matches on gender and on sur-
vey year. According to the mathematical properties of propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), consistency of the matching estimator with re-
spect to bias arising from selection on observable variables requires matching 
only on the propensity score that is a function of these variables, not on the ac-
tual values of these variables themselves.  Nonetheless, to improve precision, 
we did a third matching on estimated propensity scores with a ¼ standard devia-
tion caliper, where gender and survey year were perfectly matched, and where 
the lagged wages of all matched pairs were forced to lie within $2 per hour of 
each other or, if not working, where the matching observation also was not work-
ing. Even with this additional condition, we were still able to match most of the 
treated cases with a control case whose propensity score was within ¼ of a 
standard deviation from that of the treated case.22 We used matching with re-
placement, because research has shown this procedure to produce less bias 
than matching without replacement (Dehejia and Wahba 1998, 1999). These 
three alternative methods gave qualitatively similar results, and so we present 
only the results from our third matching procedure in the tables. 
The propensity scores themselves were estimated for the NLSY sample 
from a logistic regression of being a contingent worker on race, marital status, 
number of children ever born, the SMSA unemployment rate or non-SMSA state 
unemployment rate, education, potential labor force experience, employment 
status and hourly wage (or zero if not working) two years prior to the treatment 
time,23 whether R is working in a full-time or part-time job at the treatment time, 
the number and square of the number of job displacements since 1979 in R’s 
main job, and the number of job displacements from all other jobs besides the 
main job.24 For the French sample, we estimated the probability of an individual 
                                            
22 For the U.S., we could not match 3% of the contingent and 6% of the low tenure treated 
cases. However, all unemployed treated cases were matched. For France, 2% of contingent 
and 1% respectively of low tenure and unemployed treated cases could not be matched. 
23  Note that the estimated propensity for being in a contingent job is estimated to be a function 
of lagged wage (or zero if not working) as opposed to the current wage. Because the current 
wage is arguably a consequence of contingent job status, we do not want to confuse the 
consequences of one’s employment status with the propensity to be in that status in the first 
place.  
24  In our analyses, job information is based on the “CPS” job. The CPS job is defined as the 
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being in each of the three insecure employment statuses in 1988 as a function 
of the following covariates: gender, region of residence, education, labor force 
experience, contingent status in first job, and the prestige of first job.25 
Because we have more closely spaced panel data for the U.S than for 
France, we analyzed outcomes for Americans both two and four years in the 
future, while for the French sample we estimated outcomes five years in the fu-
ture. We estimated two year effects based on the NLSY79 subsample of 
individuals who were in the treatment state in 1994, 1996, or 1998. We deleted 
duplicate observations for all individuals who were in the treatment state in more 
than one of these years, and we then matched the remaining observations with 
other sample members who were in the control state. 
While our central focus concerns employment security, we also estimated 
the impact the different insecure statuses on wages in the American case and 
total compensation in the French case. We do this because one of the major 
reasons why employment insecurity is of theoretical and policy significance is 
because of its connection with earnings and income insecurity.  For American 
workers, we present three outcomes of the wage analysis (see note 12). The 
first compares wages (in dollars) at a specific future time point for the treatment 
and control group. The second compares wage change (in dollars) between the 
first and second time point for the two groups. The third analysis compares 
change in the log wage between the first and second time point for the two 
groups. This third analysis can be given an interpretation of percentage 
changes. For employment outcomes, and for wage and wage change outcomes, 
we estimated the mean difference between the treatment and control groups.   
For the analysis involving the change of log wages, we estimated the median 
difference of the change in the log wage for each treatment and matched control 
case, and test for differences in the median with a sign test (Sprent 1993).26 For 
the French data, we estimated the effects of the various insecure statuses on 
total compensation four years later. 
                                                                                                                                
“current or most recent job” or (if multiple jobs) the job at which R worked the most hours. 
25  Because the French data lack information about prior wages, we matched using the informa-
tion on prestige of first job in place of lagged wages.  As in the American case, we avoided 
using prestige of 1988 job to avoid confusing the propensity of being in a contingent job with 
the possible consequences of being in a contingent job.  We also used 0.25 standard devia-
tion caliper matching on the French data where we further forced the matched cases to lie 
within 5 prestige points of each other (with perfect matching on gender as well). 
26  Median differences are not sensitive to the size of outliers (rare matches where the differ-
ence in log wage or log compensation was very large, and where the impact on the sample 
mean would be a function of how we capped or trimmed these values).  The test statistic for 
the sign test, n+ is the number of differences that are greater than zero.  Under the null hy-
pothesis that the probability of a difference being positive is equal to the probability of a 
difference being negative, then n+ is Binomially distributed, i.e., n+~Binomial(n,p=1/2), where 
n is the total number of matched pairs. The test was implemented in Stata.  
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Table 1. Consequences of Contingent Job, Unemployment, and Low-Tenure 
Status Two Years in the Future by Gender, for U.S. workers 29-41 
years old 
  Conditional on Working at  
Time 2 
Unconditional on Working at 
Time 2a 
 Employment Wage Wage 
Change 
Change in 
ln(Wage)c 
Wage Wage 
change 
Change in 
ln(Wage)c 
Contingency         
All 
(N=309) 
(N=238) 
-0.12** 
(-3.7) 
-1.06 
(-1.9) 
-0.23 
(-0.3) 
0.03 
 
-1.99** 
(-3.2) 
-1.05 
(-1.6) 
-0.08 
 
Men 
(N=138) 
(N=109) 
-0.12* 
(-2.5) 
-1.78* 
(-2.2) 
0.51 
(0.4) 
0.01 
 
-2.68* 
(-2.6) 
-0.17 
(-0.1) 
-0.12 
 
Women 
(N=171) 
(N=129) 
-0.12** 
(-2.7) 
-0.48 
(-0.6) 
-0.83 
(-1.0) 
0.01 
 
-1.47* 
(-2.0) 
-1.74* 
(-2.2) 
-0.06 
 
        
Unemployment         
All 
(N=731) 
(N=545) 
-0.12** 
(-5.0) 
-2.10** 
(-3.7) 
  -2.88** 
(-5.8) 
 
  
Men 
(N=344) 
(N=249) 
-0.17** 
(-5.1) 
-2.12* 
(-2.4) 
  -3.60** 
(-4.7) 
  
Women 
(N=386) 
(N=296) 
-0.07* 
(-2.2) 
-2.15** 
(-3.0) 
  -2.28** 
(-3.6) 
  
        
Low Tenureb        
All 
(N=2808) 
(N=2401) 
-0.04** 
(-4.0) 
-0.25 
(-0.7) 
0.88** 
(2.8) 
0.05** 
 
-0.82* 
(-2.4) 
0.38 
(1.3) 
0.03** 
 
Men 
(N=1437) 
(N=1271) 
-0.04** 
(-3.1) 
-0.30 
(-0.6) 
0.80 
(1.7) 
0.06** 
 
-0.32 
(-0.6) 
0.50 
(1.1) 
0.04** 
 
Women 
(N=1371) 
(N=1130) 
-0.04** 
(-2.6) 
-0.84 
(-1.9) 
0.97* 
(2.4) 
0.05** 
 
-1.31** 
(-3.1) 
 
0.26 
(0.7) 
0.02 
 
Note: Matching was done using a 0.25 caliper along with perfect matching on gender and survey 
year, and constrained matching on wages.   See text for details.  
a Those not working at time 2 are assigned a wage of 0. 
b Contingent workers are excluded from these analyses.   
c The median differences are reported here.  See text for details.   
Source: NLSY79 data for 1994-2000.  
T-values in parentheses 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided.   
N is the number of matched pairs of observations– The first N is for the “Conditional on working 
at time 1” sample, and the N below it is for the “Conditional on working at time 1 and 2” sample.  
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 Table 2. Consequences of Contingent Job, Unemployment, and Low-Tenure Status 
Four Years in the Future by Gender, for U.S. workers 29-39 years old 
  Conditional on Working at 
Time 2 
Unconditional on Working at 
Time 2a 
 Employment Wage Wage 
Change 
Change in 
ln(Wage)c 
Wage Wage 
Change 
Change in 
ln(Wage)c 
Contingency         
All 
(N=216) 
(N=182) 
-0.03 
(-0.9) 
-1.44 
(-1.6) 
-0.68 
(-0.6) 
0.02 
 
-1.61 
(-1.8) 
-1.10 
(-1.0) 
0.03 
 
Men 
(N=97) 
(N=84) 
-0.08 
(-1.4) 
-2.77 
(-1.5) 
-0.11 
(-0.04) 
0.03 
 
-3.43 
(-1.9) 
-1.15 
(-0.5) 
0.03 
 
Women 
(N=119) 
(N=98) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.41 
(-0.5) 
-1.17 
(-1.2) 
0.01 
 
-0.23 
(-0.3) 
-1.09 
(-1.2) 
0.03 
 
        
Unemployment         
All 
(N=539) 
(N=429) 
-0.05 
(-1.9) 
-2.04** 
(-3.2) 
  -2.20** 
(-3.3) 
  
Men 
(N=257) 
(N=209) 
-0.06 
(-1.5) 
 
-2.29* 
(-2.1) 
  -2.68* 
(-2.3) 
  
Women 
(N=281) 
(N=219) 
-0.04 
(-1.1) 
-1.52* 
(-2.4) 
  -1.61* 
(-2.4) 
  
        
Low Tenureb        
All 
(N=1958) 
(N=1692) 
-0.04** 
(-3.2) 
0.15 
(0.4) 
1.06* 
(2.5) 
0.04* 
 
-0.44 
(-1.1) 
0.73 
(1.8) 
0.02 
 
Men 
(N=1013) 
(N=896) 
-0.04** 
(-2.7) 
0.27 
(0.4) 
0.88 
(1.4) 
0.02 
 
-0.39 
(-0.6) 
0.45 
(0.7) 
0.01 
 
Women 
(N=945) 
(N=796) 
-0.04 
(-1.9) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
1.27* 
(2.4) 
0.05* 
 
-0.50 
(-1.0) 
1.02 
(1.9) 
0.03 
 
Note: Matching was done using a 0.25 caliper along with perfect matching on gender and survey year, 
and constrained matching on wages.   See text for details.  
a Those not working at time 2 are assigned a wage of 0. 
b Contingent workers are excluded from these analyses.   
Source: NLSY79 data for 1994-2000. 
T-values in parentheses 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided.   
N is the number of matched pairs of observations – The first N is for the “Conditional on working at 
time 1” sample, and the second N is for the “Conditional on working at time 1 and 2” sample.   
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Table 3. Consequences on Employment in 1993 and Total Compensation in 
1992 of Contingency, Unemployment and Low Tenure in 1988 by  
Gender, for French Workers 29-39 Years Old in 1988 
Employment in 
1993 
Total compensa-
tion in 1992  
(in 1,000s of FF) 
Natural log of total 
compensation in 
1992  
(in 1,000s of FF)b 
 
Contingency in 88    
All 
(N=117) 
-0.12** 
(-3.2) 
-22.79* 
(-2.4) 
-0.29* 
 
Men 
(N=52) 
-0.15** 
(-2.7) 
-18.76 
(-1.6) 
-0.31* 
 
Women 
(N=65) 
-0.09 
(-1.8) 
-26.01 
(-1.8) 
-0.13 
    
Unemployment in 88    
All 
(N=148) 
-0.08* 
(-2.4) 
-39.18** 
(-6.2) 
-0.51** 
 
Men 
(N=65) 
-0.02 
(-0.3) 
-43.99** 
(-4.0) 
-0.42** 
 
Women 
(N=83) 
-0.13** 
(-3.2) 
-35.40** 
(-5.4) 
-0.54** 
 
    
Low tenure in 88a    
All 
(N=289) 
-0.03 
(-1.2) 
-9.64 
(-1.4) 
-0.13 
Men 
(N=191) 
-0.03 
(-1.0) 
-6.38 
(-0.7) 
-0.12 
Women 
(N=98) 
-0.03 
(-0.7) 
-15.99 
(-1.8) 
-0.15 
  
Source: FQP Survey 1993, INSEE.   
a Contingent workers are excluded from these analyses.   
bThe median differences are reported here.  See text for details.   
T-values in parentheses 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided.   
N is the number of matched pairs of observations  
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 Table 4. Proportion of Workers in Contingent Jobs, by ISIC industry group for American 
Male and Female Workers, February 1995 and 2001 
 1995 2001 Odds 
Ratio 
A – Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.049 0.056 1.2 
C – Mining and quarrying 0.027 0.010 0.4 
D – Manufacturing 0.030 0.020 0.7 
E –  Electricity, gas and water supply 0.037 0.008 0.2 
F – Construction 0.075 0.056 0.7 
G – Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles,  
      motor cycles and personal and household goods 0.025 0.024 1.0 
H – Hotels and restaurants 0.051 0.063 1.3 
I – Transport, storage and communications 0.027 0.016 0.6 
J – Financial intermediation 0.018 0.012 0.6 
K – Real estate, renting and business activities 0.072 0.051 0.7 
L – Public administration and defense; Compulsory social  
      security 0.036 0.031 0.9 
M – Education 0.123 0.097 0.8 
N – Health and Social work 0.046 0.039 0.8 
O – Other community, social and personal service activities 0.030 0.027 0.9 
P – Private households with employed persons 0.177 0.101 0.5 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1995 and 2001. 
Note: The CPS definition 3 of contingent jobs was used here, but it was modified to exclude the self-
employed.  Definition 3 of contingent jobs includes self-employed workers and independent contrac-
tors with tenure and expectation of continued employment of one year or less, as well as temporary 
workers and contract workers, regardless of their tenure or expectation of employment duration. 
Due to the very small number of observations in these categories, results for the B-Fishing and Q-
Extra-territorial organizations and body industries were omitted from these tables.   
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Table 5. Proportion of Workers in Contingent Jobs, by ISIC industry group for French  
Male and Female Workers   
 1982 1991 1995 2001 Odds 
Ratio 
82-91 
Odds 
Ratio 
91-01 
A – Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry 0.004 0.026 0.055 0.087 6.9 3.5 
C – Mining and quarrying 0.017 0.014 0.051 0.067 0.8 5.1 
D – Manufacturing 0.016 0.075 0.098 0.137 5.0 2.0 
E – Electricity, gas and water  
      supply 0.013 0.034 0.062 0.082 2.7 2.5 
F – Construction 0.032 0.079 0.099 0.126 2.6 1.7 
G – Wholesale and retail trade; 
       Repair of motor vehicles, 
       motorcycles and personal  
      and household goods 0.032 0.070 0.082 0.106 2.3 1.6 
H – Hotels and restaurants 0.045 0.119 0.134 0.133 2.9 1.1 
I – Transport, storage and 
      communications 0.011 0.050 0.095 0.100 4.6 2.1 
J – Financial intermediation 0.012 0.042 0.048 0.052 3.5 1.2 
K – Real estate, renting and 
      business activities 0.024 0.079 0.098 0.109 3.5 1.4 
L – Public administration and 
     defense; Compulsory social 
     security 0.014 0.145 0.315 0.367 11.9 3.4 
M – Education 0.182 0.311 0.512 0.456 2.0 1.9 
N – Health and Social work 0.015 0.094 0.159 0.143 6.6 1.6 
O – Other community, social 
      and personal service 
      activities 0.050 0.176 0.228 0.239 4.1 1.5 
P – Private households with 
      employed persons 0.003 0.034 0.040 0.064 11.8 1.9 
Source: French Labor Surveys 1982-2001.   
Note: Due to the very small number of observations in these categories, results for the  
B-Fishing and Q-Extra-territorial organizations and body industries were omitted from these tables.   
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 Table 6. Proportion of Workers in Insecure Statuses by Gender, U.S. and France 2001  
 U.S. 2001  France 2001 
 All Men Women  All Men Women 
18-28 years         
Unemployed 7.3% 8.2% 6.2%  16.8% 14.5% 19.5% 
Contingent 6.7% 6.6% 6.9%  37.2% 35.8% 39.1% 
Low tenure but 
not contingent 
34.5% 32.4% 36.7%  18.5% 19.6% 17.2% 
No. of obs.a 7850 
7284 
4014 
3693 
3836 
3591 
 13928 
11575 
7443 
6380 
6485 
5195 
29-39 years         
Unemployed 3.4% 3.2% 3.8%  10.2% 7.8% 12.9% 
Contingent 3.0% 2.8% 3.3%  10.8% 9.4% 12.6% 
Low tenure but 
not contingent 
16.4% 14.9% 18.1%  10.3% 10.6% 9.9% 
No. of obs.a 10399 
10033 
5516 
5330 
4883 
4703  
24506 
22108 
13185 
12232 
11321 
9876 
40-64 years         
Unemployed 2.7% 2.8% 2.6%  9.1% 7.7% 10.8% 
Contingent 2.7% 2.6% 2.8%  5.5% 4.4% 6.9% 
Low tenure but 
not contingent 
9.3% 8.2% 10.5%  4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 
No. of obs.a 18344 
17865 
 
9576 
9317 
 
8768 
8548 
  
40316 
36718 
 
21451 
19869 
 
18865 
16849 
 
        
Source: Current Population Survey, Contingent Workers Supplement, 2001; French Labour Force  
Surveys 2001. 
a The first number of observations reported refers to the population in the labor force, while the  
second refers to the employed population (from which both the contingency and non-contingent  
low tenure rates were calculated).   
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Table 7. Trends in the distribution of unemployment and insecure jobs across 
French male workers 
  
Independent variables Dependent Variables 
Unemployed 
 
Contingent (conditional 
on employed) 
Low-tenure (con-
ditional on non 
contingent) 
 
Intercept -2.52 (.09) 1.23 (.20) -.32 (.25) 
Date (ref=1990):    
1996 .42 (.10) .61 (.14) -.55 (.19) 
2002 .34 (.09) .48 (.14) -.59 (.18) 
Educational levels  
× Date (ref :3b) 
   
3a× 1990 -.36 (.14) -.50 (.11) -.11 (.10) 
3a× 1996 .12 (.09) -.14 (.09) -.16 (.13) 
3a× 2002 -.02 (.09) -.18 (.08) -.26 (.12) 
2× 1990 .18 (.10) -.20 (.10) -.36 (.10) 
2× 1996 .22 (.08) .11 (.08) -.11 (.12) 
2× 2002 .07 (.08) .20 (.07) -.09 (.11) 
1c× 1990 .25 (.09) -.29 (.08) -.62 (.08) 
1c× 1996 .35 (.07) ..01 (.07) -.37 (.10) 
1c× 2002 .14 (.07) .13 (.07) -.21 (.10) 
1b× 1990 .36 (.11) -.19 (.11) -.49 (.12) 
1b× 1996 .47 (.09) .25 (.09) -.03 (.14) 
1b× 2002 .52 (.09) .44 (.09) -.02 (.14) 
1a× 1990 1.06 (.08) .22 (.08) -.44 (.08) 
1a× 1996 1.06 (.07) .59 (.07) -.16 (.11) 
1a× 2002 1.14 (.07) .76 (.07) -.03 (.11) 
    
Age × 1996 -.001 (.002) -.010 (.003) -.002 (.004) 
Age × 2002 ..002 (.002) -.007 (.003) -.001 (.003) 
    
Age dummy vars.  
(9 categories) 
(Yes) (Yes) (Yes) 
Industry dummy vars.  
(16 categories) 
(no) (Yes) (Yes) 
Number of Observations. 126,800 114,479 99,200 
Likelihood ratio (DF) 4827 (26) 18,740 (44) 3,772 (44) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Education is measured using the CASMIN categories  
(cf. Müller and Shavit 1996).  These categories are as follows: 3b= BA+, 3a = Some Tertiary, 2 = Sec-
ondary, 1c = Basic Vocational, 1b=Compulsory Elementary, 1a=Inadequately Completed Elementary 
Education. 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided.   
Source: French Labor Surveys 1990-2002. 
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 Table 8. Trends in the distribution of unemployment and insecure jobs across 
French female workers 
  
Dependent Variables 
 
Independent variables Unemployed Contingent (condi- 
tional on employed) 
Low-tenure  
(conditional on 
non contingent) 
Intercept -1.96 (.11) 1.57 (.26) .47 (.41) 
Date (ref = 1990):    
1996 .62 (.12) .50 (.13) -.38 (.20) 
2002 -.04 (.12) .59 (.13) -.29 (.19) 
Educational levels  
× Date (ref :3b) 
   
3a× 1990 -.48 (.12) -.67 (.10) -.35 (.11) 
3a× 1996 -.28 (.08) -.37 (.08) -.20 (.13) 
3a× 2002 -.06 (.08) -.20 (.07) -.04 (.11) 
2× 1990 .16 (.10) -.31 (.09) -.56 (.11) 
2× 1996 .27 (.07) .04 (.07) -.52 (.14) 
2× 2002 .44 (.07) .26 (.06) -.05 (.12) 
1c× 1990 .70 (.09) -.19 (.08) -.75 (.10) 
1c× 1996 .60 (.07) .19 (.07) -.48 (.12) 
1c× 2002 .82 (.07) .32 (.06) -.01 (.11) 
1b× 1990 .69(.10) -.09 (.24) -.62 (.12) 
1b× 1996 .55 (.08) .25 (.09) -.17 (.15) 
1b× 2002 .94 (.08) .48 (.09)  .26 (.14) 
1a× 1990 1.31 (.09) .16 (.08) -.60 (.10) 
1a× 1996 1.20 (.06) .61 (.07) -.27 (.12) 
1a× 2002 1.45 (.07) .97 (.06)  .01 (.12) 
    
Age × 1996 -.004 (.002) -.009 (.003) -.009 (.005) 
Age × 2002 ..004 (.002) -.009 (.003) -.015 (.004) 
    
Age dummy vars. (9 catego-
ries) 
(Yes) (Yes) (Yes) 
Industry dummy vars. (16 cate-
gories) 
(no) (Yes) (Yes) 
Number of Observations. 106,581 91,964 80,523 
Likelihood ratio (DF) 5688 (28) 12,752 (44) 3,338 (44) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Education is measured using the CASMIN categories  
(cf. Müller and Shavit 1996).  These categories are as follows: 3b= BA+, 3a = Some Tertiary, 2 = Sec-
ondary, 1c = Basic Vocational, 1b=Compulsory Elementary, 1a=Inadequately Completed Elementary 
Education. 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided.   
Source: French Labor Surveys 1990-2002. 
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Table 9.  The determinants of unemployment and insecure jobs in the  
American Labor Market for Males Aged 18-64 
    
Independent Vari-
ables Unemployment Contingent Job 
Low-Tenure in 
Non-Contingent 
Job 
Intercept -3.101** (.106) -1.170** (.359) -1.822**(.442) 
Education (Ref = H.S. 
diploma)    
  
1a - <9th grade  0.475** (.063)  0.567** (.099)  0.083 (.064) 
1b - 9th-11th grade  0.719** (.041)  0.259** (.078)  0.301** (.040) 
3a Some College -0.450** (.039)  0.256** (.054)  0.055 (.028) 
3b BA+ -1.037** (.049)  0.031 (.061) -0.013 (.031) 
Survey Year (Ref 
=2001)     
  
1995  0.361** (.126)  0.498** (.176)  0.309** (.101) 
1997  0.369** (.130)  0.283 (.183)  0.434** (.103) 
1999  0.039     (.135)  0.552** (.179)  0.324** (.103) 
Age (Ref= 61-64)       
18-24  0.890** (.126)  1.008** (.167)  2.025** (.104) 
25-29  0.385** (.120)  0.306 (.158)  1.284** (.098) 
30-34  0.164    (.114)  0.152 (.149)  0.841** (.093) 
35-39  0.129    (.108) -0.158 (.143)  0.595** (.090) 
40-45  0.054    (.104) -0.122 (.136)  0.418** (.088) 
45-49  0.037    (.102) -0.222 (.133)  0.256** (.087) 
50-54 -0.031    (.103) -0.345* (.137)  0.099 (.090) 
55-60 -0.022    (.106) -0.133 (.139)  0.186* (.094) 
Interaction      
1995*age -0.004    (.003) -0.008 (.005) -0.009** (.003) 
1997*age -0.005    (.003) -0.005 (.005) -0.013**(.003) 
1999*age -0.001    (.004) -0.013**(.005) -0.010**(.003) 
Industry Dummy 
Variables (16 catego-
ries) No Yes Yes 
Number of Observa-
tions 124,280 99,538 92,637 
Likelihood Ratio (DF) 2368 (18) 2135 (33) 5949 (33) 
Wald Test of Educa-
tion*Survey Year 
from Model with In-
teractions (p-value) .063 .125 .118 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Interactions between age and  
survey date measure age as a continuous variable. 
Model coefficients are from a model that omits interactions between education and  
survey year. Wald test is from a model that includes these interactions. 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided. 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001 February Surveys,  
Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements Supplement. 
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 Table 10.  The determinants of unemployment and insecure jobs in the  
  American Labor Market for Females Aged 18-64 
    
Independent Vari-
ables Unemployment Contingent Job 
Low-Tenure in 
Non-Contingent 
Job 
 
Intercept -3.582** (.137) -2.598** (.187) -2.180** (.137) 
Education (Ref = H.S. 
diploma)      
1a - <9th grade  1.004**  (.076)  0.589** (.135)  0.226** (.080) 
1b - 9th-11th grade  0.828**  (.049)  0.395** (.084)  0.388** (.044) 
3a Some College -0.372** (.041)  0.195** (.051) -0.001 (.027) 
3b BA+ -0.866** (.053) -0.033 (.055) -0.078** (.030) 
Survey Year (Ref 
=2001)      
1995  0.555** (.147)  0.747** (.173)  0.068 (.103) 
1997  0.763** (.146)  0.382* (.176)  0.286** (.103) 
1999  0.491** (.154)  0.555** (.180)  0.251* (.102) 
Age (Ref= 61-64)      
18-24  1.092** (.155)  1.089** (.177)  2.364** (.112) 
25-29  0.790** (.148)  0.289 (.167)  1.684** (.107) 
30-34  0.661** (.141)  0.075 (.159)  1.336** (.103) 
35-39  0.438** (.135) -0.022 (.148)  1.065** (.099) 
40-45  0.424** (.131) -0.123 (.141)  0.902** (.097) 
45-49  0.402** (.128) -0.109 (.137)  0.697** (.097) 
50-54  0.217     (.131) -0.273* (.138)  0.495** (.099) 
55-60  0.068     (.139) -0.103 (.143)  0.368** (.104) 
Interaction      
1995*age -0.009*   (.004) -0.013** (.005) -0.003 (.003) 
1997*age -0.014** (.004) -0.005 (.005) -0.009** (.003) 
1999*age -0.012** (.004) -0.011* (.005) -0.008** (.003) 
      
Number of Observa-
tions 113,361 91,166 84,510 
Likelihood Ratio (DF) 1860 (18) 1903 (32) 5601 (32) 
Wald Test of Educa-
tion*Survey Year 
from Model with In-
teractions  (p-value) .286 0.000 .264 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Interactions between age and survey  
date measure age as a continuous variable. 
Model coefficients are from a model that omits interactions between education and survey  
year.  Wald test is from a model that includes these interactions. 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, two-sided. 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001 February Surveys,  
Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements Supplement. 
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